Risk Informed Design as Part of the Systems Engineering Process by Deckert, George
www.nasa.gov
Risk Informed Design as 
Part of the Systems Engineering Process
CHSF Symposium AIAA NASA October 14-15, 2010
George Deckert – NASA
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100037185 2019-08-30T12:22:39+00:00Z
What is Risk Informed Design (RID)?
♦ The intent of Risk Informed Design is to make informed design trades in 
consciously buying down risk to the crew and the mission 
• Establishing the relative importance of risk drivers so that design and operations decisions can 
be made early in the Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) cycle to effectively 
mitigate risk
• Better  balancing risk against other design commodities (cost, mass, power, etc.) in the iterative 
design and planning process
• Controlling design complexity (historically a significant factor in system failures)
♦ Understanding and taking action to mitigate the most important risks early, 
limits the likelihood of having to “accept” risk later on in the product life cycle
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• The process is a continuous process throughout the lifecycle 
of the Orion Project
• At each design and verification  cycle, work to reduce the risk 
drivers
• Focus on the Top Drivers to maximize impact
• When new drivers emerge (new cycles) as Top Drivers, work 
those drivers
• Key decision points emerge at various program milestones 
(e.g. Achievability)
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• Use of Operational 
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Start with
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RID Approach
♦RID is based on the principle that risk is a design commodity 
such as mass, volume, cost or power. 
♦Both Qualitative and Quantitative risk analyses  are used to 
expose dominant risk contributors, design trades and planning 
alternatives in the context of assigning critical design 
commodities. 
♦RID is accomplished as part of the systems engineering design 
process.
♦Risk analysis includes all significant failure types, including: 
functional, phenomenological, software, human reliability, 
common cause, and external or environmental events.
♦Complexity and fidelity of analysis is consistent with the 
available data and information during each design cycle
• Early in development: Analysis done using higher level heritage based risk 
models
• Models and analysis then mature with design and gain additional detail
• Late in development:  Models reflect “as designed” system and provide 
sufficient fidelity to evaluate aggregate risk for verification purposes
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Integrated Decision Packages
♦ An example of integrating the decision packages to show management 
the relationships between the Loss of Crew Risk, Mass and Cost.
• These DPs have been sorted by the delta risk.  You could sort on any of your 
design “commodities”
4
Delta 
Mass
Delta 
Cost
Delta
 Risk
Cumulative
Vehicle Risk
Baseline 0 0 0 1.00E-02
DP 14 150 50 2.00E-03 8.00E-03
DP 11 67 11 1.00E-03 7.00E-03
DP 10 18 30 8.00E-04 6.20E-03
DP 7 12 6 5.00E-04 5.70E-03
DP 2 20 20 4.00E-04 5.30E-03
DP 8 5 1 3.00E-04 5.00E-03
DP 4 7 15 2.00E-05 4.98E-03
DP 13 98 13 2.00E-05 4.96E-03
DP 3 10 8 1.00E-05 4.95E-03
DP 9 100 12 6.00E-06 4.94E-03
DP 1 3 1 5.00E-06 4.94E-03
DP 6 15 2 4.00E-06 4.94E-03
DP 12 34 7 1.00E-06 4.93E-03
DP 5 50 19 8.00E-07 4.93E-03
DP 15 75 25 6.00E-08 4.93E-03
Backup Material
RID Process (Step 1)
♦The RID process generally 
follows a three phase process.
1.Early design concepts are defined 
with minimally required 
functionality to perform the 
mission and no redundancy. 
• Initial focus on 
implementing “Key 
Driving Requirements” 
vs. establishing a fully 
functional, acceptably 
safe, or highly reliable 
design. 
• Risk analyses are 
performed during this 
phase to understand the 
risk vulnerabilities of this 
“zero based design” 
(ZBD).  
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RID Process (Step 2)
2. Once a ZBD baseline has been established, design enhancements are 
evaluated with a focus on enhanced functionality and Loss of Crew 
(LOC) risk. 
• Focus: “Make the design work” and “Make the design safe”. 
• Design is evaluated to determine the best ways to mitigate the risk of the vehicle.  
• Methods may include: adding a function (e.g., an abort capability), looking at a diverse 
method for performing the critical function (dissimilar functional redundancy), increased 
testing to improve reliability, selecting more reliable components, adding margin to the 
system or adding similar redundancy.    
• Risk mitigation methods are selectively applied to more optimally reduce risk while 
maintaining performance and cost objectives, with a priority on diversity vs. simple 
redundancy. 
• Major Premise: Simply adding redundancy is one option to improve safety and reliability. It 
is not the only option.  It is not always the safest or most cost effective option.  
• Many different investment portfolios (Decision Packages) are compared using Figures of 
Merit (FOMs) derived from key risk commodities, including LOC risk in order to develop a 
more functional and safe design within available resources. 
• Goal: Spend scarce risk mitigation resources (mass, power, volume, cost) most effectively 
to maximally address risk.
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3. Finally, additional enhancements are considered which more 
fully address functional requirements and focus on reliability 
and the Loss of Mission (LOM) risk. 
• A portfolio approach to comparing investments is again used
• Ensures that the final design iteration produces a vehicle that more optimally 
meets functional requirements safely, reliably, and within budget.
RID Process (Step 3)
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RID Summary
♦“Build-Up” approach from the zero based design to a 
risk balanced design assures that affirmative 
rationale is used for the system design, its 
complexity, and the existence of each system 
element. 
• Rationale exists to justify resource allocations such as: mass, 
power, and cost. 
• Build up approach lessens the likelihood of having to make 
dramatic design changes later in the design cycle to resolve critical 
commodity shortfalls and get back “in the box.” 
• The process is a continuous process throughout the lifecycle 
of the Orion Project
• At each design and verification  cycle, work to reduce the risk 
drivers
• Focus on the Top Drivers to maximize impact
• When new drivers emerge (new cycles) as Top Drivers, work 
those drivers
• Key decision points emerge at various program milestones 
(e.g. Achievability)
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PROBABILISTIC RISK 
ASSESSMENT
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PRA through Product Life Cycle 
♦PRA in Design
• Design seeks to optimize programs, missions, or systems to meet objectives and requirements within 
given constraints
• PRA evaluates risk of alternative designs, relative risks of subsystem contributors and identifies how 
risks can be minimized through design change or other means
♦PRA in Operation
• Normal operation, normal and accident operating procedures, and maintenance can cause increased 
risks
• PRA is eminently suited to assess these risks as well as to guide and optimize “configuration 
management” for minimum risk
♦PRA for Upgrade
• Improvements in design can result in risk increase
• PRA can evaluate upgrade alternatives and show the least risky ones
♦PRA for Decommissioning
• End of life presents situations when safety can be compromised and regulatory requirements breached
• PRA can guide the removal-from-service process to accomplish it safely and within regulatory 
constraints
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Why PRA?
♦ In some cases, qualitative functional redundancy analyses can adequately assess 
reliability. Due to the high-hazard missions and the system complexity 
associated with Human Space Flight, quantification of risk to the crew and 
mission is needed.
♦ “Risk”: scenarios, associated frequencies, and associated consequences
♦ The quantitative risk perspective gained from PRA allows for evaluation of design 
based on:
• Comprehensive set of failure scenarios and consequence severity
• System’s ability to cope with off-nominal events
• Effectiveness of mitigation capabilities
• Identification and expected frequency estimation of risk-significant failure modes
• Consideration of support systems and environmental conditions
♦ PRA is used to identify potential risk reduction measures and to support 
decisions regarding change in design or operational practice.
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Elements of PRA
♦ Master Logic Diagrams (MLDs) – Top-down display of initiating events (IEs), or perturbations 
requiring system or crew response. Increases in event description detail at lower tiers, with 
IEs at bottom. Supports identification of comprehensive set of IEs.
♦ Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) — Flowchart with scenario paths leading to end states. 
Detailed graphical representation enhances communication between PRA analysts, 
designers, operations, and crews.
♦ End States — Consequences, such as Loss of Mission (LOM) or Loss of Crew (LOC), that 
terminate event sequences because the outcome is known.
♦ Event Tree (ET) — Classifies scenarios according to consequences. Typically portrays 
progression of events, which are either occurring or non-occurring, over time. “Down” tree 
branch considered failure, “up” considered success.
♦ Fault Tree (FT) — Logical depiction (AND, OR, NofM gates) of combinations of events that 
violate success criteria. Events that appear in multiple trees correspond to subsystem or 
phase interdependencies. Scenario frequency is calculated by linking ETs and FTs.
♦ Data Collection — Process of collecting and analyzing available information to estimate 
parameters of the model. Includes component failure rates, human failure probabilities, 
common cause failure probabilities, phenomenological event estimation, software failure 
probabilities, etc.
♦ Uncertainty Analyses — Development of scenario introduces model assumptions and 
parameters that are based on what is currently known about the behavior of systems under 
given conditions. Important to properly account for both natural variability of physical 
process and uncertainties in knowledge of the processes.
♦ Presentation of Results — Development of appropriate displays to communicate the model 
results, the most important contributors to risk, and the associated model uncertainty.
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NASA’s PRA Process
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PRA Throughout Project Lifecycle
♦ Model and data improvement continue throughout the lifecycle
♦ Risk informed design, test and operations continue throughout the  
Project lifecycle
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Notional Cut-set Output
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Source Subsys Pf Name Description Group End Phase
PRA 1 Descent system 1.50E-04 ML-MCXCXX-CFXXXX Main parachute CCF Parachutes Phase 8
PRA 1 Thermal Protection 2.80E-04 CT-LDG-STPSX-DMXXXX Side TPS attachment failure Side TPS Phase 8
PRA 1 Ascent Escape 8.79E-05 MM-LOF--EMSEP-FFXXXX Escape Motor separation  Failure Escape Motor Phase 2
PRA 1 Descent system 1.07E-04 ML-DCXCXX-CDXXXX Drogue Chute Canopy Parachutes Phase 8
PRA 1 Software 5.43E-05 CA-CDHSWF-SWXXXX SW failure Software Phase 8
PRA 1 Thermal Protection 9.29E-05 CT--BSTPSX-UTXXXX Back Shell Side TPS Phase 8
PRA 1 Descent system 2.84E-05 ML-PENCUT-CFXXXX Parachute Staging  CCF Parachutes Phase 8
PRA 1 Thermal Protection 8.22E-05 CT-HSTPSX-DMXXXX Heat Shield Main TPS Phase 8
PRA 1 Mechanisms 1.11E-04 MM-DJLSC1-FFXXXX Separation Charge 1 failure Separation System Phase 5
PRA 1 Propulsion 6.56E-05 SP-RXXTVX-COXXXX Thruster CCF Reactive Control System Phase 7
… … … ... … … ….
Informing the Design
♦Identify functional groupings that represent risk 
scenarios common to a particular function.
• These come from the “Group” column of the cut-set spreadsheet.
♦Usually build the Pareto chart based on the top 95% of 
vehicle risk in order to illustrate the key drivers.
• This is done to again help focus discussions on key drivers
♦Designers can focus on the top few risk contributors 
that represent the greatest “bang for the buck”.
♦Allow the design teams to address specific failure 
scenarios and develop focused solutions rather than 
simply adding redundancy across the system.
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Example Pareto Chart
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USE OF THE PRA OUTPUT IN 
DESIGN TRADE STUDIES
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Design Trades
♦Design options are developed for each of the top design drivers 
as shown in the Pareto Chart.
♦These options are compared to the baseline design to show 
expected changes to the Probability of Failure
Results Subsystem System
Configuration Prob. of Failure (Pf) 1/Pf % Reduction % Reduction
Design Driver 1.00E-4 10,000 N/A N/A
Design Driver + Design 
Option #1 5.00E-5 20,000 10% 1%
Design Driver + Design 
Option #2 7.50E-5 13,333 6% 0.5%
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Design Trades cont.
♦Once design options are viewed within the particular 
design drivers, Decision Packages are prepared which 
would look at each option pulling estimates of mass, 
power, cost, risk, etc.
♦These Decision Packages are then viewed from an 
integrated perspective.
• The idea here is to choose the combination of Decision Packages 
that will reduce the risk to crew and show what the impacts would 
be for our other design “commodities” (mass, power, cost, etc.).
♦These integrated packages are provided to the project 
management so they can make their design decisions.
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Example Pareto Chart
♦The Yellow diamonds represent an example of 
comparing the previous design drivers to what we 
expect to see after changes are accepted.
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Results from the RID Process
♦With this information, decision makers can make informed 
decisions as to where to draw the line to get the most “bang for 
your buck”.
♦So from our example, the decision could be include DPs 14, 11, 
10, 07, 02, and 08.
• This seems to be the combination where we have a “knee” in the curve 
when looking at mass.
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SUMMARY
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♦The use of the RID process in the 
development of the Constellation Program has 
been very beneficial.
♦For the first time in a major human spaceflight 
program, risk to the crew and mission has 
been a part of the design and development 
process instead of waiting for the design to be 
completed and then assessing the risk to the 
crew and mission. 
♦This Process has been adopted by NASA as 
the way to develop Spacecraft and Launch 
Vehicles.
26
